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C'I' Tlf2 STr1.TE OF UTAH

anrt Respondent,
Case No. 18987
J;,"f

«I:HARD NEbTO!l,
Defendant and

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to
evidence which he alleged was seized in violation of his
rHJc<ts under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the
Constitution and Article I, Sections 12 and 14 of
chu Constitution of Utah.
DISPOSITIO'.l IN T'-IE LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged by information in the Third
Jud1ci3l District Court with forgery, a felony of the second
.:c··Lc»0

,

and theft, a

of the third degree.

On January 14, 1983, the appellant's motion to suppress
:1e alleged was seized in violation of his constitutional
1 1

•;c1s

heard before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Third
The motion was subsequently denied.

The appellant then waived his c1nht
tried before the Honnra'Jl_,

L-11'-

l.n-1

J

L

•

I

l

January 24, 1983.
not guilty of the theft
day to the statutory t:erm of cne tc fifteen ;-e<'trs in the state
prison.

The appellant seeks a reversal of the denial of h1s
suppression motion and consequently a reversal
The charges should then be

his convict1nn.

or a new trial granted.

STATEMEtTT OF F_!\CTS
On January 20, 1982, one James Alfred Clark, store
manager for Reams Bargain Annex, was presented with a ch12c:<
for $397.43 drawn on an account entitled Peck and Peck (R-44)
He cashed the check (R-45)

for the individual who gave it to him,

writing down the individual's social security
license number on the check ( R-4 6) .

and driver's

He did not identify the

defendant as the person who gave him the chec''

(R-47).

had not in fact been drawn or authorized by Peck and Peck
nor had the person to whom the check had been made out ever
seen it (R-56).
The man to whom the check had been made out, on12 Fre2r,
had earlier misplaced his driver's license

(R-53).

He also

stated that while he had a social security number he had no
social security card (T-61, 62).

Nevertheless, a social securi t'-'

card with his number and a driver's license with his licer,sc
-2-

1

'

1

i'.

3,

red a:; idce:1tification for the check
3tzite'sexhibit 1).

On J', .,··ucir-/ 18, 1982, a Dennis Holm of Adult Probation
,:;

; :i.rolc: ·,;on'. t.c• the premise3 of a Debbie and Leon Smith to

i,1vesti Ji1t2 ,, sho0'.ing
the ctule prison

(R-64, 67-68).

r-65)

occ 1Jt=iants of the pre!l'ises
fold 2r one

Smith was on parole from

The Smith's were the exclusive
(R-69).

Mrs. Smith then gave Holm a

thick full of papers

1

(R-70).

The folder

contai:1ed driver's licenses with the pictures cut out, social
securitJ cards, business cards, and several blank checks
o.rnony the ;:oapers •,;as Frear's lost lice!1se

(R-66).

these items was a violation of Smith's parole

(R-67, 78).

Possession
(R-72).

On January 19, 1982, a month before the Smith search,
the appellant was arrested by a George Sinclair (R-79) .

The

arrest was for a charge not related to the ;:oresent case as the
warra:1t was issued in December, 1981 (R-80).

Newton had in his

pccsession a bank account card with the name Frear on it (R-75)
He did not have either the license or the social security card
i;,

?rear's narr.e 1,·!:ic'1 were shown as identi::'ication in Reams the
day.

Newton has been incarcerated from January 19th

to tC.1e pre3er.t tine

(R-80, R-130).

Cn April 14, 1982, a Sandy City police officer named
was advised by Sinclair of Newton's irrest in

'ihert

and also that Frear's license with Newton's picture
on it had been found in the search of Srni th 1 s home in

c

b1·uar

(P-100).

(Note- at one point Nortz testified this had
but h,e later corrected his mistake

'lo•t7

,Jc,·ided to interview }!ewton at the jail
-3-

(R-95)

(R-123, R-101)

The appellant moved to suppress the re. 0 ul t.-;
and during the trial

(R-22, R-92,

c)F

R-138-1421.

the intervic'..i
],,__

'

'- motion

'·''·3'.:>

d·_:_-n:

(R-29).
Nortz did in fact contact Newton in the

jail

(R-12S,.

He told Newton he was investigating a forged check and would 11";
talk to him about it.
rights

(R-126).

He first advised him of his so-called

He had no search warrant

Newton was represented by an attorney
an attorney
(R-102).

(R-128), didn't as:, if

(R-125), didn't ask if he r.a.j

(R-125), and no attorney was present during the i'1ter-.· 1

However, Newton had been represented by counsel at his

request since his arrest on the other charges in January, 1982
(R-130, 131).
Nortz showed Newton two checks, one marked "Leon
the parolee, and the other was the Lee Peck check

( R-12 6) .

llewton

denied any knowledge of either check and Nortz then asked him to
out a handwriting s?ecimen sheet, telling him first only that he
didn't have to do it if he didn't want to,
filled the sheet out

(R-129).

(R-127-128).

Newton

The sheet was then sent to a

handwriting expert at Weber State University

(R-129).

The expert testified that the author of the handwriting
sample and the endorsement on the rear of the Lee Peck check -.-1as
the same person

(R-106).

The Court then found the appellant

of forgery and not guilty of theft

(R-116).

ARGUMENT
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED
HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT AND
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

-4-

actions of the police deprived the appellant of
,-,,ch,1:cs

the most

riqht in the criminal justice system,

to counsel.
': 1

n

'1'J"=

to tl1e

The investigating officer, acting on a

amounting tc tirobable cause, went without a search warrant
where the appellant had been held for three months

en another charge.

His intention was to gather evidence.

The

of a warrant would seem to violate the precepts of the
F'ourth '\mendment and Article I, Section 14 of the federal and
state constitutions.

Once there, the officer made no inquiry

as to whether the appellant had counsel although he was aware
of the pe11ding charges and the length of time the appellant
had been jailed.

He took a handwriting sample from the appellant

which proved to be the sole link at trial between the appellant
and the alleged forgery.

This, too, would seem to violate a

constitutional guarantee, the state Article I, Section 12 right
not to give evidence against oneself, Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d
315 (Utah 1980).

To these claimed constitutional violations the

State will be heard to say that the appellant was given a
Miranda warning and thus he voluntarily waived his rights.

Such

an argument cannot be sustained because even a Miranda warning
will not overcome the fact that all of the officer's actions
occurred in the absence of the appellant's counsel.

It is the

denLal of this most fundamental right which mandates a
suupression of the handwriting exemplar and thus a reversal of
t

convict ion.

It is permissible to interrogate an accused who has
l'1•rn':·crl his right to silence,

his Fifth Amendment right, about
-5-

other, unrelated crimes he m3y have colTs;-:ittcd once he ha.s 3gain
1

been given the Miranda •.varninq,
(1975).

423 U.S. 96

It is significant here tl1cit "at no time in the

questioning did Mosely indicate a desire to consult
lawyer .

." 423 U.S. 96, 97.

a

;.. more recent case, Edwards v.

Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), demonstrates the greater p::-otectio;·
afforded to one who invokes his right to counsel, his Sixth
Amendment right.
In Edwards, the accused was charged with three serious
felonies.

The arresting officers proposed a plea bargain and

he responded, "I want an attorney before making a deal", 451 U.S.
477, 479.

Questioning ceased.

The following day, Edwards was

again given his Miranda rights and questioned about the crime.
This time he confessed, 451 U.S. 477, 479.

The Court observed,

"waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also
constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends
in each case'upon the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused'
The Court concluded,

[citations omitted]," 451 U.S. 477, 483.
. that when an accused has invoked his

right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a
valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing
only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial
interrogation even if he has been advised of his
added).

(€mphasi 0

We further hold that an accused, such as Edwaros, havinq
-6-

his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,
is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
,-_,uns-cl nas been made available to him, unless the accused
t'1mself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485.

Edward's

confession was suppressed and his conviction reversed.
The impact of Edwards on the present case is starkly
apparent.

The appellant here had not only invoked his right to

counsel, he had secured representation.

He may have given the

handwriting sample atter receiving a Miranda warning but Edwards
expressly held that the mere giving of such a warning would not
constitute the waiver of counsel by one who had invoked that
right.

The police here, as in Edwards, were constitutionally

bound to deal with the appellant through his attorney and their
failure to observe that right requires that the handwriting
sample acquired in the absence of counsel be suppressed.
It is of no significance that the officer here
interrogated the appellant about an offense unrelated to the
one for which counsel had been requested and secured because
Edwards creates no such exception to its rule.

To repeat,

Edwards says that an accused, "having expressed a desire to deal
with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him," unless he himself initiates the contact,

451 U.S. 477, 484-485.

Edwards does not permit interrogation of

one who asks for or who has counsel on some subjects but not
-7-

others, it flatly prohibits any

in the

of counsel.
The antecedents of

of the

decision lie in a group of cases decided in New York under the
state constitutional right to counsel, precisely the same as the
Utah provision.

The first of these cases was People v. Poaers,

48 N.Y. 2d 167, 397 N.E. 2d 709

(1979).

Rogers was arrested

for robbery, an attorney entered the case, and interrogation on
the robbery ceased.

However, several hours later, after the

accused purportedly ·.vaived his rights, interrogation commenced
on some unrelated activities to which the accused confessed,
397 N.E. 2d 709, 711.

The Court declared,

. that or.ce

a defendant is represented by an attorney, the police may not
elicit from him any statements, except those necessary for
processing or his physical needs.

Nor may they seek a waiver

of this right, except in the presence of counsel," 397 N.E. 2d 70Q,
713.

The Court's rationale for its conclusion is illuminating,

"An attorney is charged with protecting the rights of his client
and it would be to ignore reality to deny the role of counsel
when the particular episode of questioning does not concern the
pending charge.

It cannot te assumed that an attorney would

abandon his client merely because the police represent that they
seek to question on a matter unrelated to the charge on which
the attorney has been retained or assigned.

Finally,

it is the

role of defendant's attorney, not the State, to determine
whether a particular matter will or will not touch upcn the
-8-

charge.

Once a defendant has an attorney as advocate of

h1° >l'J".ts, the att•Jc!lt"/'s function cannot be negated by the simple
in his absence.

of

The presence of counsel confers no undue advantage to
accused.

Rather, the attorney's presence serves to

'''.;ualiz9 the position's of the accused and sovereign, mitigating
the coercive influence of the State and rendering it less
overwhelming.

That the rule diminishes the likelihood of a waiver

of self incriminating statements is
Justice,

[citati•:ms omitted].

to our system of

Although the State has a

interest in investigating and prosecuting criminal
conduct, that interest cannot override the fundamental right to
an attorney guaranteed by our State Constitution.

Available are

means other than subjecting a person represented by an attorney
interrogation in the absence of counsel," 397 N.E. 2d 709, 713.
Rogers has been followed in People v. Ferrara, 54 N.Y. 2d 498,

no

'.LE. 2d 1275 (1981); People v. Coulter, 84 A.D. 669, 446 NYS

2d 618

(1981); and People v. Moore, 448 NYS 2d 213

(1982).

The reasoning of Edwards and Rogers ought to be
compelling here if the right to counsel is not to be diluted in
the state of Utah.

The appellant was a captive audience for the

interrogation, having been in jail for three months.
attorne;.

He had an

The attorney should not have to concern himself over

wnetner the police are visiting his client without his knowledge
0r consent.

It would be ludicrous to conclude that if

1n•errogation is permitted, unknown to the attorney, on "unrelated"
the interrogators will scrupulously avoid the charge on
-9-

which representation has been
counsel must not be underestimated.
the defendant, an unsophisticated

h2ve immediate]

been informed that the handwriting samr:ile could not Lie .:lcquired
without a warrant and in any event he could refuse to give it
pursuant to Hansen v. Owens.

A:o the Court obsep;ed in !'agers,

it is the presence of any attorney which serves to equalize the
power of the state and the accused.

If the state is permitted

this Court to circumvent the attorney then that precarious oalance
will tip overwhelmingly in favor of the state.
CONCLUSION
The handwriting sample taken in the absence of counsel
must be suppressed and the conviction reversed.
DATED this

11

day of __

r___.._ _ , 19 8 3 •

EDWARD K. BR..i\SS
Attorney for Appellant
321 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone:
322-5678
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